

C-II ~~SECRET~~ 1940'4
NOTES
U-2 + EST.

1. When was ~~that~~ OC/ instruction on photo verification?

2. When was info on IL-28's released to public?

[Was it important to the secrecy of 15-22 Oct that special security was attached already to offensive cap. in Cuba — because of political considerations?

~ Oct 4, Oct 12-22.

[Question for Ex-Com: What was the effect on US decision-making of: surprise; deception; prior mis-estimates?

How could K have reduced his risks? Achieved success? What would have been effect of telling Pres?

Suppose Pres had known of move at time of embarkation in SU? What would he have done? ...]

[What other advantageous moves for SO are being regarded as unlikely because "too risky," or because of other premises underlying Cuban estimates?]

3. Where info on Committee on Overhead Recon? When met?

What was our planning in case of incident?

Are ops worldwide coordinated — special care to avoid incidents when on important operation is going on?

4. Was Sept 10 meeting scheduled because of 8 Sept shootdown?

Was flight cancelled? Were missiles considered?

5. When did pressure build for invest. of MRBM sites? Who?

(McC's schedule?)

6. Who was told Oct 14 — really? Who told him: why?

Who was not told, ~~what~~ was told soon thereafter?

Who was left out deliberately?

When, during evening?

[Who was "in" by accident of timing, presence?
Johnson?

Did no one besides McG want to talk to Pres? Did
they know he didn't know?

7. What were their first reactions — Oct 15? What
did they do? Who did they tell? Any meetings, prior
to Ex Comm meeting?

8. Did U-2 fly on Oct 16? Might Pres have ordered this ³
Oct 15?

23, 29, 35, 41 —

70, 78, 96

10. What discussion, Tuesday morning Oct 16?

(Who did Pres talk to between 9 and 11:45?

Evening: 6:30 meeting? Who? Why in Sec State's meeting,

11? What discussed?

11. Who had "mistake" notion? Bundy...

12. What were early attitudes of ExComm on the remaining puzzles of operation? SC deception? SC expectations? Relation to politics, the election?

13. What defensive behavior appeared early: e.g. intell. comm, to cover failure?

[22 Oct: comm NSC: sing one song; don't tell about...

14. Who did early est. of requirements for strike? [McN?]
[Soyuz?]

[50 sorties, 75 bombs for MRCMs; + 100 sorties for airfields;
+ 200 for SAMs. 2000 sorties/4000 bombs for invasion.]

[Thoughts: K planned to come to NY, UN late in November —
after American elections; K thought meeting at that time
would be useful. G instructed to make clear
that aid to Cuba was solely for the purpose of contributing
to the defensive capability of Cuba.]

JFK: aid to Cuba was having a profound impact on
American people + Congress. G: mutual Bay of Pigs.
Pres act in that he'd already told K that was a mistake,
and that had he been asked he would have given
assurances there would be no further invasion attempt.
But since July when arms shipments started, situation
had changed. G: Sov specialists were giving training in
handling certain kinds of defensive arms — and he wished to stress
the word defensive.

One read Sept 4 statement, warning US would not
tolerate...)

15. War game of blockade + large strike night of 19 Oct?

[On 21 Oct: set of 7 days to prepare air strike, + 7-10 for invasion]

[McN private analysis of effects of missiles?]

16. What if U-2 had been shot down? What
planning for this, Oct 16-28? What was read
from Saw failure to shoot? How clear was message
to Sars 16-22, of flights thought to be?

W/ko?

"mistake — like U-2 in 1960" Bundy

tolerate missiles as targets Taylor; McN?

Tink : Bell, Thompson, Paul (most/all thought I would ask)

(17) too much self respect to respond by an act of aggression:
Bundy: I know right.

political approach... going down with a whimper: Johnson

first of a series of pressures — McL.

I would retal — perhaps w/o Tink Thompson.

96 , 110, 126 , 136-37

Source: 1) Committee on Overhead Recon: CIA

2) Meetings of ExComm (minutes from 20th by Bundy; Nitgenotes?) State

3) Gromyko. special, in State

4) SNIE Oct. 19

5) Final draft of Pres speech, night of Oct 19

2 10 10

6) Macmillan letter to JFK 22 Oct. State

7) Memos: DeLoach - Thompson L?

- Lammson L

- Bowles (Oct 13; Sept 6?) State

Ball on Report to FIB:

a) "McC is just internationally suspicious."

b) McC was always for more recon — everywhere.

(Argued on Oct 4 — had no real evidence of murders).

c) Interdepartmental special group on recon intell.


~~Effect~~ effect d

d) Comm. on Overhead Recon had practice of determining on quota + allocation of flights for month, then not meeting to consider more (next month) till that quota had been flown — even though that set of flights might run into the next month, because of bad weather.

On 10 Sept, they set quota which ~~with~~ — because of weather constraints set — was not completed till flight of Oct 7. ~~It~~ It was directed at finding extent of SAMs; those already found were not flown over again.

The indications of MRBM's available after mid-Sept were not such as to make specific investigation seem necessary.

(Carroll?) although suspicious area included on flight planned Oct 10 (mainly to recheck SAM's seen earlier).



Great-Power Deception

Hard to conceal from great power; easier to deceive, mislead



— about timing, precise target, purpose

(which affects other actions taken or avoided simultaneously or subsequently, actions of others supported or opposed)

Why deceive? If it is necessary, that suggests the existence of major ~~cross~~ conflict

~~Special~~

~~19~~ 19 Sept raised possibility that SU would send weapons represented to be defensive in purpose but of a more "offensive" character.

[Recognizing that they might use words this way amounts to saying that the words they were using did not constitute a clear reassurance.

Why didn't anyone ask? Some: because they didn't believe there was a real danger.

Mishkin or others would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Sov relations than the USSR has displayed ~~thus far~~ for

[Depends on the amount of risk the Soviets estimated: i.e. their estimate of JFK's crisis behavior; our est assumes they would see risk high: this is a prediction.

Photos: over and over again it made fools of ground observers by proving their reports inaccurate or wrong.

Two classical invitations to error in estimating business:

- 1) neglect or wishful misvaluation of evidence because it does not ~~not~~ support a preconceived hypothesis.
- 2) kicking problem under rug (not raising hypotheses, giving weight of evidence, giving opinion?)

(There was a strong alternative hypothesis — part experience, + prudence, both suggested a stopping-place to slow military presence — though not necessarily short of IL-28's or F-4's, troops; not made there contingent on slow est of whether there would provoke a US military reaction.) [Would they? They were in commitment — which did not specify military action. Were IL-28's, SAMs a test? Sourensen did show sensitivity to SAMs — deliberate + personal affront — which might have been warning: but we did nothing, accepted ^{defensive} formulae.

[Was there a question of doing something? A crisis?

Planning? Why not? What if SAMs, or missiles, had
come out of the blue, without prior leaks, or testing?

Who drew the line; and why?